RECENT CASES
ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION

OF STATE COURT-WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

AcTs-The defendant ice company had a contract to deliver ice to a steamship.
B, as box-man of the ice company, was sent to assist in the storing of the ice
in the ship, and while so helping, he was killed. Suit was brought to recover
damages under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Held: The state court had
no jurisdiction because the contract and tort were maritime. Jones v. Crescent
Ice Mfg. Co., no So. 182 (La., 1926).
The Constitution of the United States' and subsequent legislation have
vested in the Federal Government exclusive jurisdiction in matters pertaining
to admiralty and maritime causes, saving, however, "to suitors in all cases the
right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." '
With the passage of the various workmen's compensation acts, the question
arose whether the state courts would have concurrent jurisdiction with the
admiralty court, or whether the admiralty court would have exclusive jurisdiction. If the state court had concurrent jurisdiction, an injured employee could
recover damages under the Workmen's Compensation Act; but if the admiralty
court alone had jurisdiction, then the employee could only recover under the
maritime law. In the leading case, Southern Pacific v. Jensen,' where a stevedore was injured while working on a dock, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Workmen's Compensation Act was not applicable to such injuries
because the granting of jurisdiction to the state courts would destroy the harmony of the maritime law as afforded by the Constitution. The grave injustice
to stevedores and laborers working ground ships prompted Congress to pass
amendments to the so-called "saving clause" of the Judicial Code,' which gave
"claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any
state"; but the Supreme Court held these amendments unconstitutional.! It was
then left to the Court to determine how far the doctrine of the Jensen case was
'Art. III, Sec. 2: "The judicial power shall . . . extend to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. . .
'Judiciary Act of 1789, I STAT. 76, 77; Judicial Code of 1911, 36 STAT.
1o91, U.

S.

COMP. STAT.

(SuPP. 1913)

§991 (3).

For retention of the "saving

clause" through various enactments, see REv. STAT. (2d ed. 1878) 95.
3244
U. S. 205 (1917). For criticisms of the Jensen case see, Fell, Recent
Problems in Admiralty Jurisdiction, 40 JoHNs HoPxINS STUDIES 288 (1922);
Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction of Late Years, 37 HAV. L. REv. 529 (1924).
'Southern Pacific v. Jensen, supra note 3, at 216: "And plainly, we think,
no such legislation is valid, if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by
.an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of
the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony of that law in
its international and interstate relations."
'Supra note 2.
'40 STAT. 395 (917), U. S. COMP. STAT. (1918) §§g91(3), 1233, held
unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920);
and 42 STAT. 634 (1922), U. S. COMP.STAT. (SuPP.1925) §991(3), held unconstitutional in Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S.219 (1924). The latter case
further held that a state statute cannot bring stevedoring within the operation
of the workmen's compensation act.
(469)
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to be carried.' The cases subsequent to the Jensen case seem to fall into the
following classes: (1) Where the tort and contract are both maritime, the
admiralty court has exclusive jurisdiction ;' (2) where the tort is maritime and
the contract is non-maritime, the state court has concurrent jurisdiction over
the matter and the workmen's compensation act is applicable;9 (3) where the
contract is maritime, but the tort is non-maritime, the state court also has a like
jurisdiction;"O and (4) where the contract and tort are both maritime, but of
such nature as not seriously to affect the harmony and uniformity desirable in
the maritime law, the state court has jurisdiction.'
Maine has attempted to
distinguish between compulsory and optional workmen's compensation acts.Y
"See Washington v. Dawson, supra note 6, at 228, where Justice Holmes
in dissenting said: "The reasoning of Southern Pacific v. Jensen and cases following it never satisfied me and therefore I should have been glad to see a limit
set to the principle. But I must leave it to those who think the principle right
to say how far it extends." For further articles relating to the doctrine of the
Jensen case, see bibliography cited by Justice Brandeis in Washington v. Dawson, at 236; 40 H v. L. REv. 485, Note (1927).
'Southern Pacific v. Jensen, supra note 3; Washington v. Dawson, supra
note 6; O'Hara's Case, 248 Mass. 3, i42 N. E. 844 (1924) (where plaintiff
received two injuries, one in a dry dock, the other in a dry dock affixed to
land); Newham v. Chile Exporting Co., 232 N. Y. 37, 133 N. E. 120 (1921)
(where plaintiff was a checker overseeing stevedores); Butler v. Robins Dry
Dock, 24o N. Y. 23, 147 N. E. 234 (1925) (workman repairing vessel in graven
dock) ; Bell v. Southern Casualty Co., _67 S. W. 531 (Tex. 1924) (longshoreman doing work on ship).
'Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922) (carpenter
working on unfinished ship); Ex parte Harvard, 211 Ala. 6o5, OO So. 897
(1924) (lumber inspector injured while on a tug tallying lumber), with which
compare Newham v. Chile Exporting Co., supra note 8. The fact that the tort
was committed on navigable waters is not the sole test. Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde, supra. See 73 U. oF PA. L. REv. i9o, Note (1924).
" Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt, 259 U. S. 263 (1923) (longshoreman working on dock); Shea v. Industrial Commission, 247 Pac. 770 (Ind.
1926) ; Atlantic Shipping Co. v. Royster, 148 Md. 443, 129 At. 668 (1925)
(fall from pier to water) ; Marsh v. Vulcan Iron Works, 129 At. 709 (N. J.
1925) ; Miller Industrial Underwriters v. Baudreau, 261 S. W. 137 (Tex.
1924) (deep sea diver working from barge to fix ways of dock attached to
land) ; Scott v. Dept. of Labor, 228 Pac. 1013 (Wash. 1924) (stevedore working
on dock fell to deck of vessel).
' Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1922) ; City of Oakland v.
Industrial Commission of Cal., 198 Cal. 273, 244 Pac. 353 (1926) (city dredge
though used throughout San Francisco Bay) ; Leszczymski v. Radel Oyster Co.,
102 Conn. 511, 129 Atl. 539 (1925)
(workman engaged in fishing contract fell
off boat) ; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Bacon, 30 Ga. App. 728, 119 S. E. 458 (1923)
(fishing contract); Miller v. Alaska S.S. Co., 246 Pac. 296 (Wash. 1926)
(operating winches on a vessel loading piles). For further collection of cases,
see 25 A. L. R. 1029, note (0923), 31 A. L. R. 518, note (1924).
See also
Wright, Uniformity of the Maritime Law, 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 123, 223
(1924), with which compare Canfield, Uniformity of the Maritime Law, 24
Micx. L. REV. 544 (1926). A survey of the cases cited in notes 8, 9, lo and
ii supra shows the arbitrary distinctions made by the courts in the attempt to
get around a harsh rule.
' Optional workmen's compensation acts make it elective with the employer
and employee to accept the form of compensating for injuries prescribed by
statute, or to retain the common law rights and liabilities. Compulsory workmen's compensation acts afford no such option. 28 R. C. L. 732.
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Its act being optional, it held the Jensen case inapplicable.u This Maine decision
has been criticised on the ground that an election between the parties to a suit
cannot confer jurisdiction.1 ' In the principal case, although the contract between
the ship and the ice company was maritime, it is questionable whether the
boxman's work can be construed as maritime. But even if one assumes that he
was performing a maritime service, it would seem that the case should fall in
the fourth class which confers jurisdiction on the state court.

BANKRUPTC--LIENS--PROMISE TO REIMBURSE FOR LOAN FROM PRocEEDS
OF GOODS TO BE SoLD--The defendant loaned money to the corporation and
agreed to be reimbursed from the proceeds of the sale of goods. The reimbursement was made within four months prior to bankruptcy and while the corporation was insolvent. The trustee brings this action on the theory that such payment was a preference under §6oa of the Bankruptcy Act. The defendant
claims payment was made in satisfaction of a valid lien .and was, therefore, protected by §67d of the Act Held: Defendant had a lien and therefore did not
come within §6oa. Coppard v. Martin, 15 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926).
Under §67d of the Act the holder of a valid lien is preferred to general creditors. In the principal case it is assumed that the effect of the promise
made to the defendant was to create an assignment of the proceeds of the goods
to be sold.' With this for its premise the court's ratiocination establishes a lien
in his favor. In its premise, however, it evidently disregards the fact that there
is a distinct difference between an actual assignment of a present fund and a
mere promise to make future payments out of a fund when it shall come into
being. It is only where there is a transfer of rights to a present fund that an
equitable assignment exists.' It would seem, therefore, that the position taken
by the court is untenable. In situations similar to that of the principal case it
should be realized that the intention must be to create a lien as distinguished
from an agreement to apply the proceeds of a sale to the payment of a debt.
To create a lien there must be a clear intention to make the particular property
described a security for the debt In the principal case there is nothing to indicate that the creditors agreed to appropriate any specific property as security for
the advances made. They simply agreed to apply the proceeds of such sales as
might be made to its payment, and that is insufficient to create an equitable lien.!
And if the defendant cannot be considered as the holder of a lien, it seems that
payment in full of his claim was a preference under §6oa of the Act.
' 1Berry v. Donovan, 120 Me. 457, 115 Atl. 25o (1921).
"Bell v. Southern Casualty Co., supra note 8, at 533.
132 STAT. 790, U. S. COMP. STAT. (1913)
236 STAT. 842, U. S. COMP. STAT. (1913)

§9644.
§9651.

3 15 F. (2d) at 745.
' Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 84 (U. S. 1872) ; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall.
441 (U. S. 1875) ; Story v. Hull, 143 Ill. 5o6, 12 N. E. 265 (z892).
'POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3rd ed. 1918) §1235.
'Hibernian Banking Ass'n v. Davis, 29 Ill. 537, 129 N. E. 54o (192o);
1914) §32.
JONES, LIE-s (3rd ed.
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CONTRACS-OFFER

AND ACCEPTANCE-SENDING

OF APPLICATION BY IN-

SuRmR-An application for life insurance, tendered by the plaintiff's decedent,

was rejected because he was a heavy drinker. The defendant informed him
that if he would abstain from drink and apply again a year later, they "would
give the case further consideration." Of their own initiative the defendants
forwarded an application blank a year later. The decedent filled it out, paid a
premium, and took a "binding receipt" giving coverage as of date of application,
if accepted. The application was promptly rejected but notice of this action
was not received for over a month, during which time the death occurred.
Held: Plaintiff can recover on a contract to insure. Stanton v. Equitable Life
Assurance Co., 135 S. E. 367 (S. C. 1926).
The majority of the court decided the case on the theory that the forwarding of the application with knowledge of the previous circumstances was an
offer to insure. This offer was accepted by the payment of the premium, the
applicant being in a physical condition which was not impaired by drinking
within a year. The forwarding of an application is generally an invitation to
negotiate,' and it is difficult to see how a previous rejection by the insurance
company could turn this into an offer. It is also questionable procedure to allow
the jury, as was done here, to find such an offer! The theory of the dissenting
judges seems more logical: the issuance of the "binding receipt" was the acceptance of a contract to insure, conditional upon the insurance company's finding
the applicant an insurable risk at the time of the application The decision
cannot be supported on any theory of contract. The view that the silence of the
insurance company was tantamount to an acceptance is not tenable,' and this is
not a situation where the previous conduct of the offeree made the applicailt
understand that silence would amount to an acceptance The result could have
been obtained in some jurisdictions on a theory of tort or quasi-contract-that
there was a duty to the applicant to inform him of the decision promptly.' It
is submitted that this is the desirable solution, and the one which courts are
willing to adopt.
1 1 JOYCE, INSURANCE (2d. ed. 1917) §54. Nor is there an obligation on the
company to accept because it is an insurable risk. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Young, go U. S. 85 (1874); Harp v. Granger's Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 49 Md.
309 (1878).

Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
Cf. Carter v. Banker's Life Ins. Co., 83 Neb. 810, 120
N. W. 455 (9o9) (counter offer in different fiscal terms).
3 1 ELLIOT, EVIDENCE (1904) §30, and cases cited.
This is the usual construction given to such receipts. Mohrstadt v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 115 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o2); Pace v. Provident Life Assur.
26 YALE L. J. 181 (1917).

Co., 113 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 5th, 19o2) ; Cooksey v. Insurance Co., 73 Ark. xi7,
83 S. W. 317 (1904), and cases cited I JOYCE, op. cit. supra note I, §64.

'See cases cited in Funk, Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on ApplicaR. A. (N. S.) 1211

tions, 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 210 (1927), nn. 7, 8; 36 L.
note (1912).

al WILuSTON, CONTRACTS (1920)

§91; Corbin, supra note 2, at 169.

Cf.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1925)

§70 (1) c.
Funk, supra note 5, at 244.
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CRIMINAL LAW-GRAND LARCENY-VAuE OF LicENsE TAGs-The defendant was indicted for grand larceny of license tags of an automobile. By statute

grand larceny was made the stealing of personal property worth more than $io.
The original cost of taking out license tags was $I6, while the cost of replacement was $r. Held: The defendant guilty of grand larceny. Cowan v. State,
287 S. W. 2oi (Ark. 1926).

The majority of the court held the value of the license tags was the original cost of taking out the license. Since the evidence of the right to operate a
car cost the owner $16 to secure in the first place, the defendant was convicted
of stealing license tags of the value of $16. This reasoning would seem to be
fallacious. It confuses the right to operate a car with the evidence of that
right. The felonious taking of the tags has not deprived the owner of the right
itself, for, as the dissenting opinion points out, the owner's loss is but $I, the
cost of replacement. Such was the value of the tags themselves. The balance
of the original fee must be apportioned to the right. It was contended by the
State that this case came under a statute holding it to be larceny to steal the
means and muniments by which right and title to property, real or personal, may
be ascertained. But license tags are probably not the means by which right and
title are ascertained within the meaning of the statute. Rather, it would seem
to apply to the registration card, or the official receipt. In any case, the further
question arises whether the right to operate a car could be held such personal
property under the statute as would make the license tags the means of ascertaining title thereto. The license is a personal privilege granted by the state
allowing the use of the car on the highways. It is not the subject of barter and
sale;' and the money paid for such a license right is not a tax on property.'
As choses in action at common law were not the subject of larceny,5 so even
less would seem to be a personal privilege of this sort. Thus the right to operate a car would not appear to be property under the statute strictly construed,
as criminal statutes must be.4 Even if the license tags do come under the
statute, their value still remains $I. While there is a statute fixing the value of
certain choses in action as the value of the money they represent, it does not
apply to license tags. The necessary conclusion seems to be that license tags
are, as the subject of larceny, only of value as bits of metal, and that these
statutes, which are nearly uniform, do not apply to increase their value.
1287 S. W. at 2o2.
'ARK. DIG. STA:T. (Crawford 19i2) §2484.
'Forshee v. State, 15 Ala. App. 113, 72 So. 685 (1916) ; Bleon v. Emery,
6o Utah 582, 29 Pac. 627 (I922) ; BERRY, AUTOMOBI.ES (5th ed. i926) 84
' State v. Lawrence, io8 Miss. 291, 66 Sq. 745 (914) ; State v. Collins, 94
Wash. 310, x62 Pac. 556 (917) ; HUDDY, AUTQMOBII.E (7th ed. 3[924) 82.
'2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (IIth ed. i9T2) 1331.
36 Cyc. 1183.
ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford i921) §2445.
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DEEDs-DEPOSIT WITH THnu PRsoN FOR DELIVERY TO GRANTEE AFTER
GRANTOR'S DEATH-Suit was brought to cancel a deed executed to the defendant after the drawing of the will under which the plaintiffs claimed. The testatrix handed the deed in a sealed envelope to a third party telling him to open it
upon her death and follow the instructions within. The defendant, to whom the
testatrix told what she had done, said she would accept the deed. After the
testatrix's death, the envelope was opened but was found to contain nothing but
the deed, which was then delivered to the defendant. Held: The deed is testamentary and must be cancelled as insufficient within the statute of wills. Van
Huff v. Wagner, 287 S. W. 1O38 (Mo. 1926).
The deposit of a deed with a third party, without reservation of control,
to be transferred to the grantee upon the grantor's death, is a valid delivery 1
Whether control is reserved is determined primarily by the grantor's intention,'
which will be inferred from his words and acts.' In the principal case the court
found that the testatrix intended the deed not to be operative until her death.
The court's basis for this conclusion was that the grantor left the third party
in ignorance of the envelope's contents; that the instructions she mentioned were
not enclosed, the only guide being the deed itself; and that these factors all
indicated the instrument was to be operative only after her death. That the deed
was testamentary for this reason is a conclusion which may be questioned.
This was a departure from the general rule under which, not the intention as to
the time of operation, but the intention as to the finality of delivery, would be
examined. The evidence showed that the testatrix meant her act to be irrevocable. She avoided a direct delivery so that she might be undisturbed in her
possession for the remainder of her life. The reservation gave her no control
over the deed. Had she brought about the destruction of the deed, the grantee's
right would still have been recognized.4 Such destruction could only be used to
show an intention in the grantor to retain control.5 There are dicta to the
effect that equity will protect a grantee if a grantor fraudulently reposseses
himself of a deed.6 There is a diversity of opinion as to when title passes by
such a deed. A majority holds that title vests in the grantee at the time of
delivery by the grantor to the third party, subject to the right of possession in
the grantor for life.' Other views are that the title passes only upon actual
'Martin v. Caldwell, 49 Ind. App. 1, 96 N. E. 66o (1911); Collins v.
Norton, 81 Kan. 33, 1O5 Pac. 26 (19o9); Wicklund v. Lindquist, io2 Minn.
321, 113 N. W. 631 (19o7); Thrush v. Thrush, 63 Ore. 143, 126 Pac. 994
(1912).
2Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1 (1915); Rice v. Carey,
170
Cal. 748, 151 Pac. 135 (1915); Rowley v. Bowyer, 75 N. J. Eq. 80, 71 Atl. 398
(19o8) ; Henry v. Phillips, 1O5 Tex. 459, 151 S. W. 533 (1912).
'Linn v. Linn, 261 Ill. 6o6, 1O4 N. E. 229 (1914).
"Gomel v. McDaniels, 269 IIl. 362, lO9 N. E. 996 (1915); Arnegaard v.
Arnegaard, 7 N. Dak. 475, 75 N. W. 797 (1898) ; Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash.
351, 98 Pac. 756 (i909).
'Latshaw v. Latshaw, 266 Ill. 44, O7 N. E. iii (1914).
'Bigelow, Conditional Deliveries of Deeds of Land, 26 HARV. L. Rxv. 565,
577 (1913).
Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 447 (18o7) ; Loomis v. Loomis, 178
Mich. !2I, 144 N. W. 552 (1913); Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, supra note 4;
Henry. v. Phillips, supra note 2; Maxwell v. Harper, supra note 4.
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delivery to the grantee, or at the instant of the grantor's death, but subject to
be construed retroactively to the original delivery where other claims intervene.
It is submitted that the principal case might better have been decided had one
of these views been adopted. Although there are cases in accord, it seems
excessive to require the grantor to state explicitly that title is to pass at once to
prevent a testamentary construction from being put upon the instrument. The
general adoption of such a rule would tend to wipe out this mode of transfer
of property.
EMINENT DOMAIN-PROPERTY SUBJECT

TO

CONDEMNATION-RIGHT TO RUN

HIGHWAY THROUGH RAILROAD YARD-Proceedings were instituted in the
county court to open a highway over land occupied by a railroad yard, under a
statute giving the court full authority to make and enforce all orders for opening new roads. The railroad contended that the statute 1 did not give authority
to take land used for yard purposes. Held: The judgment granting relief was
within the exercise of the sound discretion of the county court. Kansas City
Southern Ry. v. Sevier County, 286 S. W. io35 (majority opinion), 287 S. W.
404 (concurring opinion) (Ark. 1926).'
While acceptable on its own facts, the decision departs from the usual construction of such statutes. The right of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and is vested solely in the legislature. The question is political,
rather than judicial. The exercise of this power may be delegated by the legislature, but as the power is in derogation of the common right to the enjoyment
of property, the acts conferring it are to be strictly construed. It is held, furthermore, that property already deioted to a public use cannot be taken for
another public use which will destroy or materially interfere with the former
use, unless the legislature has expressly manifested that intention.' The two
inconsistent uses cannot coexist. Because of their semi-public nature, railroads
come within this rule, whether their lands be acquired by purchase or by eminent domain.' Consequently, statutes granting the general power to lay out
'Kirkwood v. Smith, 212 111. 395, 72 N. E. 427 (1904) ; Williams v. Latham,
165, 20 S. W. 99 (1892); Stonehill v. Hastings, 2o2 N. Y. 115, 94
N. E. IO68 (I9ii); Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa. 434 (1872).
'Williams v. Kidd; Rice v. Carey, both supra note 2; Latshaw v. Latshaw,
supra note 5; Coles v. Belford, 289 Mo. 97, 232 S. W. 728 (1921),
'ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford ig2I) §5226.
'The concurring justices dissented from the reasoning, but accepted the
result, as the portion of the yard taken was not then in actual use.
'20 C. J. 513; 3 DILoN, MUNICIPAL CoRpoRATioNs (5th ed. 1911) §1036,
and cases cited, it. I.
'United States v. Rauers, 7o Fed. 748 (S. D. Ga. 1895); Comiskey v.
Lynn, 226 Mass. 21o, 115 N. E. 312 (1917) - Ontario Knitting Co. v. State, 2o5
N. Y. 4o9, 98 N. E. go (1912).
'Adirondack R. R. v. New York, 176 TJ. S. 335 (19oo); in re Saratoga
Ave., 226 N. Y. r28, 123 N. E. 197 (1917); In re Normal School, 213 Pa. 244,
62 Atl. 9o8 (I9o6).
'Chicago R. R. v. Lost Nation, 237 Fed. 709 (S. D. Iowa 1916) ; Boston
R. R. v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 224, 44 N. E. I4o (1896).
113 Mo.
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streets, without more, are considered to permit a highway across tracks, as this
would not interfere materially with their efficiency, but not to allow condemnation of a yard or depot grounds The Pennsylvania decisions state the general
rule, but from a failure to recognize their public function, do not apply it to
railroads.8 Beyond all considerations both of principle and of obvious public
policy, it seems better to draw a definite line, rather than to expose each case
to the toils of litigation.

EVIDENCE-PRESUMiPTION-NEGLIGENCE
KILLED ON

OF

PARENTS

WHEN

CHILD

Is

STREET-Action for the loss of services caused by the death of the

plaintiff's infant son, who was killed by the alleged negligence of the defendant's
servant On the issues of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory guilt, the jury found for the plaintiff. Subsequently, the court granted
judgment non obstante veredicto, on the ground that there was a presumption of
negligence arising from the fact that the child was killed while in a public
street unattended, and that the plaintiff, having introduced no evidence to rebut
the presumption, was not entitled to recover. Held: That the presumption on
which judgment was granted does not exist. Datolla v. Burke Bros., Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, decided Jan. 3, 1927.
The decision in the principal case dispels much of the doubt created by the
confusing statements in Pennsylvania cases relative to the evidential effect of
the fact of an infant's unexplained presence in a public street unprotected, when
the parents are trying to recover for their loss resulting from an injury to their
child. In the early case of Glassey v. Hestonville, etc., Ry.,1 the Supreme Court
held that it was error for the trial court to refuse to charge that "the fact that
a young child is found in a public street alone and unprotected, is presumptive
evidence that he was so exposed, voluntarily and negligently, by his parents."
Through judicial obiter, the language in the Glassey case was expanded until
one finds appearing in the cases such declarations as "Whether the plaintiff
rebutted the presumption of negligence arising from the fact that the child was
on the street alone was a question for the jury." ' These dicta are all overruled
by the principal case. The decision here seems clearly to be correct, in view of
the fact that it has been stated that the practical effect of all presumptions recognized in Pennsylvania is to shift the "risk of persuasion."' While, therefore,
contributory guilt is normally an affirmative defense,4 the practical result of a
'Paterson R. R. v. Paterson, 72 N. J. L. 112, 6o Atl. 47 (1905) ; People v.
New York Central R. R., 156 N. Y. 570, 51 N. E. 312 (1898)
aPittsburgh R. R. v. Butler, 242 Pa. 461, 89 AtI. 579 (1913) ; Philadelphia
R. R. v. Philadelphia, 9 Phila. 563 (1872).
Pa. 172 (1868).
Rossi v. Cooney, 208 Pa. 233, at 237, 57 AtI. 514, at 515 (904);
Parotta v. Pennsylvania, etc., Ry. Co., 4o Pa. Super. 138, at 142 (1909).
157
2Del

'Bohlen, Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions on the Burden of Proof, 68
U. OF PA. L. REv. 307 (I920), at 308, and n. 2.
'Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa. 463 (185I) ; Coolbroth v. P. R. R.,
58 Atl. 808 (1904).
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presumption in this instance would be to create the anomalous situation of forcing the plaintiff parents to disprove contributory fault. Moreover, it is a general
proposition that even the stronger facts of permitting a child to be on the street
unattended are not negligence as a matter of law, but the question is for the
jury under all of the circumstances.5 To give the technical effect of a presumption to the unexplained fact would be, it is submitted, equivalent to ruling that
that single fact, in absence of any of the surrounding circumstances, is negligence as a matter of law, and, therefore, contrary to the general proposition.
Again, since presumptions have their basis in the probative strength of a fact,"
it would appear to be erroneous to raise a presumption on this fact, inasmuch as
it is just as likely that the child is on the street despite proper parental care, as
it is that he is there through parental neglect. Finally, the more modern view,
and the weight of authority, favors the submission of the question of the
parents' contributory guilt to the jury in every case," except where only one
inference is reasonable.8 Yet these cases do not seem to deny that the fact of
the child's presence on the street unprotected is some evidence for the jury to
consider. A few early cases have held that this fact is prima face evidence of
contributory negligence.'

INSuRANcE-BREAcH OF WARPANTY-ESTOPPEL AND WA-vm-Plaintiff sued
on a burglary insurance policy on the front of which was printed "Please Read
Your Policy." Among its provisions was a warranty that, "no burglary insurance applied for or carried by the assured has ever been declined or cancelled."
An application by the plaintiff had in fact been declined and a policy had been
cancelled. A loss occurred and the plaintiff endeavored to introduce parol evidence showing that defendant knew of the breach of the warranty upon the
issuance of the policy, and therefore should be estopped from relying on the
warranty. Held: Defendant is not estopped. Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co., 243 N. Y. 385, 153 N. E. 844 (16).
The question of estoppel' and waiver 'in insurance contracts has come

'Fox v. Oakland, etc., Ry. Co., 118 Cal. 55, 50 Pac. 25 (1897); Cleveland,
etc., R. R. Co. v. Keely, 138 Ind. 6oo, 37 N. E. 4o6 (1894) ; Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., rio N. Y. 5o4, 18 N. E. ,o8 (x888) ; Parznik v. Central Abattoir
Co., 284 Pa. 393, 131 Aft. 372 (1925) ; I THomPsoN, NEGLIGENCE, (1901) §324;
BEACH, CONTIUToRY NEGLIGENCE, (3d ed. 1899) §450.
'Greer v. U. S., 245 U. S. 559 (917) ; WIGMoRE, EvmmcE, (2d ed. x923)
§2491.
' Cases cited supra note 5.
"'Westerberg v. Kinzua, etc., R. R. Co., 142 Pa. 471, 21 Atl. 878 (189i);
Pollack v. P. R. R., 210 Pa. 634, 6o Atl. 312 (1905).
'St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41 (i88o) ; Wright v. Maiden,
etc., Ry. Co., 4 Allen 283 (Mass. 1862); Gibbons v. Williams, 135 Mass. 333
(1883) ; Harrington v. Butte, etc., Ry. Co., 37 Mont. 169, 95 Pac. 8 (1908).
'BowER, ESTOPPEL (1923) §15; 2 POmEROY, EQUITY (4th ed. I918) §8o,
et seq. For history of estoppel see 2 Co. Lrrr. *352a.
'Adams v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 193 Iowa 1027, 188 N. W. 823 (1922);
Fed. Land Bank v. Atlas Assur. Co., 125 S. E. 631 (N. C. 1924); 2 JoYcE,
IsuR

cE (2d ed. 1917) 1307.
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before the courts many times,' and while the distinction between estoppel and
waiver is well settled,4 some courts' and text writers' use them interchangeably.
Parol evidence 7 can be admitted to prove an estoppel,' but it cannot be admitted
to prove a waiver.' Where, as in the principal case, the company has knowledge
at the inception of the policy of facts which it might set up as causing a forfeiture, and yet takes no action toward the cancellation of the policy, it would
seem that a clear case of estoppel exists0 The insurer through his act in
issuing the policy has falsely made a statement of a material fact, knowing that
it would be relied on, namely, that the policy validly covered the risk. The
insured in reliance on the act paid his premium and made no further effort to
secure insurance. All of this was conceded in the principal case, but the court
held that the plaintiff was precluded from recovery because of three factors:
no fraud was claimed, there was notice to the insured to read the policy, and
the breach was of a warranty and not of a condition. It is well settled that
fraud need not be a concomitant of estoppel." It is equally well settled that to
deprive the insured of the claim of estoppel, his knowledge must be such as to
put him on inquiry. Constructive or imputed knowledge is insufficient. Hence,
it is no answer to the insured's claim to say that he is presumed to know the
terms of his policy, when by reading the policy he might have discovered the
truth." Furthermore, in this connection it is immaterial whether an averment
of the insured is a warranty" or a condition, inasmuch as estoppel applies
equally well to warranties and conditions.1 It therefore becomes difficult to
'For

collection of cases see 7 Coor.Ey, Ba'Eis

oN INsuRANcE (1919)

976

et seq.; 32 C. J. 1343.

'Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall.

(1871); Draper v. Oswego Fire Ass'n.,
See
Vance, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law, 34 YALE L. J.834 (1925) for an
excellent article on this entire subject.
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Grove, 215 Ili. 299, 302, 74 N. E. 141, 142 (1905);
"The doctrine of waiver as applied to such a case as this is that of estoppel in
pais. There is no substantial distinction between the two, and the terms are used
interchangeably, a waiver being only another name for an estoppel."
'RIciARns, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1916) 171.
'See 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §240o et seq., for history of the
rule.
'Vance, supra note 4, at 858: ". . . of course the parol testimony rule
has no application to proof of estoppels which are shown not to modify any
provisions of the contract, but to prevent the insurer from saying that the
policy which he had falsely asserted to be valid was really invalid all the time."
See 5 MINN. L. REV. 136, Note (1920) for collection of cases.
See Vance, supra note 4, at 841, n. 31 for collection of cases.
"Supra note 4.
222

19o N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755 (1907) ; 2 JOYcE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1311.

12

PoNmERoY, op. cit. supra note, at 164o.

"Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 24 Ariz. 86, 2o6 Pac. io8i
Bushbloom v. Fire Ins. Co., 197 N. W. 957 (Neb. 1924) ; Eaton v. Nat.
Casualty Co., 122 Wash. 477, 210 Pac. 779 (1922).
"For definition see 3 JOYCE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3192.
"O'Rourke v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 R. I. 457, 46o, 5o Atl. 834,
(1922);

835 (1902) : ".

. . the purpose of warranties in a policy is not to set a trap

for applicants, but to inform the company about important facts upon which the
contract is based. When therefore a company was actually in possession of

RECENT CASES
support the decision in the principal case. The only explanation"5 that can be
offered is that the court had in mind not estoppel but waiver. They considered
that the plaintiff was endeavoring to prove a prior parol agreement inconsistent
with the terms of a written contract, and refused to allow him to violate the
parol evidence rule. In doing this the court appears to have rendered a decision
which is counter to the heavy weight of authority.'

TRESPASS-AcTIONs--RECOVERY BY TENANT IN ComMoN-The plaintiffs,

tenants in common as to a moiety of the fee in land, sued the defendants as
trespassers to recover possession of the land and to recover damages for injury
to the land. It was argued that the plaintiffs should only recover as to their
one-half interest. Held: Full recovery allowed. Spencer v. Pierce, 287 S. W.
Ioig (Ark. 1926).
At common law the rule was that a tenant in common had an estate entirely
separate from that of his cotenant, and, since he could prove title only to a part,
he could only recover in ejectment to the extent of his title.' The effect of such
a judgment was to give the plaintiff possession of the property in common with
the trespasser until such time as the remaining cotenants of the title chose
entirely to evict him. This view was adopted by the early American authorities,
but the trend of the later cases is toward a view in accord with that of the
principal case.' The theory of these later cases is that ejectment is a possessory
action, that the cotenant is entitled to possession of all the property, and that
this is sufficient for a full recovery.' It is submitted that the view of the principal case, though not entirely consonant with the conception of a cotenancy, best
accomplishes justice between the parties. The. remedy given is an eviction of
knowledge of a former rejection of the insured . . . it would be a perversion

of the purpose of a warranty to allow it to avoid the policy." See 4 JoYc, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 3728.
" Vance, supra note 4, at 858, n. 95.
'Supra note 3; Central Market Street Co. v. North British Ins. Co., 245
Pa. 272, 91 At. 662 (1914).

Contra: Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View

Building Ass'n., 183 U. S. 308 (902)
(three justices dissenting), criticised
in Grand View Building Ass'n. v. Northern Assur. Co., 73 Neb. I49, 156, 102
N. W. 246, 248 (i9o5) : ". . . the adherence to the letter of an antiquated
and wornout technical formality, seems to us to be an ironical commentary upon
the often repeated judicial boast that the law is a progressive science, and that
the courts are continually adapting their processes and proceedipgs to changing
social and business needs and customs."

'Mobley v. Bruner, 59 Pa. 481 (1868).
'Baker v. Chastang, 18 Ala. 417 (i85o); Wilson v. Chandler, 6o Ga. 129
(1878) ; Minke's Lessee v. McNamee, 30 Md. 294 (1868) ; Kirk v. Bowling, 20
Neb. 260, 29 N. W. 928 (1886); Cruger v. McLaury, 41 N. Y. 219 (1869);
Mobley v. Bruner, supra note I.
'Richmond Cedar Works v. Stringfellow, 36 Fed. 264 (E. D. N. C. i916);
Hooper v. Bankhead, i7I Ala. 626, 54 So. 549 (xIgi)
(apparently overlooking
the earlier ease of Baker v. Chastang, supra note'2) ; Gilchrist v. Middleton, 1o7
N. C. 663, 12 S.E. 85 (189o); Winbourne y. Lumber Co., 13o N. C. 32, 40
S. E. 825 (19o2) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 8o Tem. ioI, I5 S. W. 705 (i89i).

'Hooper v. Bankhead; Winbourne v. Lui iber Co., both supra note 3.
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the trespasser-the result desired-whereas the remedy of the other cases merely
lets the cotenant into possession.
The full recovery of damages by a cotenant for injury to the land is also
subject to a difference of opinion among the courts. Both views agree in holding that trespass is a possessory action, but one set of courts holds that the one
entitled to possession should only recover for the injury to his possession and
that damages for permanent injury are recoverable only by the owners of the
property according to their shares.5 The other view, the one of the principal
case, is that possession is sufficient for a recovery in full since the action is
based on possession e The view of the principal case prevents a multiplicity of
suits, one by each cotenant, and since no injury is done to the trespasser by a
full recovery in one suit, as he must pay in full for any injury inflicted in any
event, it is submitted that this is the preferable view.
5

Lowery v. Rowland, 104 Ala. 42o, 16 So. 88 (1893) ; Winbourne v. Lumber
Co., rupra note 3 (allowing a full recovery in ejectment but only a partial recovery of damages); Rowland v. Murphy, 66 Tex. 534, 1 S. W. 658 (i886).
' Perry v. Jeffries, 61 S. C. 292, 39 S. E. 515 (19O1).

